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Absurd: Allowing The Business of Football to Override the Craft of Scouting

Former NFL executive Michael Lombardi is a good place to begin. He built his career on the NFL's executive paradigm.

Anthony Richardson's draft stock just keeps rising. But to think he deserves to be taken in the top 5 isn't just absurd - it's absurd-squared.

Check out #GMShuffle at https://t.co/b4sYN4CC91 pic.twitter.com/aO4N11O3Np

— Michael Lombardi (@mlombardiNFL) April 7, 2023

The paradigm is flawed in cover-your-assets thinking — guard rails for quarterbacking that reduce risk. Running a football team is a business. Playing, coaching, and scouting football is a craft.

It's not much different than the movies. Director Mel Brooks is a master of slapstick comedy. He was also the producer of one of the most disturbing and saddest movies I've ever seen, David Lynch's "The Elephant Man," based on the life of Joseph Merrick.

Film School Rejects retells the conflict between the craftsmen and the businessmen over the direction of the film:

After The Elephant Man was finished, Brooks and Lynch screened it for the film’s distributor, Paramount Pictures. The story goes that the studio wanted to cut “the more surreal sequences.” Brooks had none of that. “We screened the film for you to bring you up to date as to the status of that venture,” he responded. “Do not misconstrue this as our soliciting the input of raging primitives.”

Rules or Guidelines?

This conflict between business and craft exists in pro football, especially when the decision is drafting a first-round quarterback. The craft of scouting a quarterback involves film study, analytical research, workouts, and astute interviewing skills. For many teams, the business of valuing rookie quarterbacks revolves around arbitrary guardrails that Bill Parcells created long ago that need to evolve:

• Minimum of three years as a starter.
• A college senior.
• A college graduate.
• 30 starts.
• 23 wins.
• Deliver a 2-1 TD-to-INT ratio.
• Minimum of a 60 percent completion rate.

These rules are worthwhile guard rails to reduce risk. A head coach like Parcells can also do a convincing job of explaining why each rule has value. But they should be called guidelines rather than rules.

These guidelines appeal to the K.I.S.S. Method of executive leadership in most business circles. If you've noticed, most NFL executives value players as first-round prospects based on a lot more than how well a player performs on tape. They want resume bullet points that are easily digestible for the media and public that communicate they are making a logical decision:

• Box score statistical production.
• Winning program.
• Reputed program.
• Reliabilty-good health.
• Looks the part (physical dimensions and, historically, skin color).
• Standardized test smarts, which, if you watch the college admissions scandal are biased toward wealth and privilege and not intelligence translatable to the field.

All of this is about saving face. Missing on a quarterback who hits all the K.I.S.S. Method or Parcells bullet points can be explained away better than deviating from the guidelines.

Breaking rules implies negative consequences. Yet, here is just a short list of quarterbacks that did not meet all of the criteria of the rules. Some came close; some were missing several criteria:

• Cam Newton
• Patrick Mahomes II
• Trevor Lawrence
• Andrew Luck
• Matt Ryan
• Tom Brady
• Joe Flacco
• Aaron Rodgers
• Ben Roethlisberger

There are several more I could have mentioned. Parcells's “rules” are meant to be broken. I prefer to use the term guidelines because the closer the player is to fulfilling every guideline, the safer his prospects will be. These guidelines appeal to a head coach like Bill Parcells whose hands-on work with players and scheme was with the defensive side of the ball.

Its simplicity appeals to football executives because it feels like timeless football wisdom. However, football and the analysis of the game have evolved since the Parcells era. There’s a lot more information available for teams to contextualize box score data. How well teams use this information is a different story, but we know they can now examine accuracy independent of completion percentage and touchdown-to-interception ratios.

Lamar Jackson’s and Baker Mayfield’s completion percentages were pre-draft points of analysis that I railed against. The prevailing points of view were that Jackson was a raw passer and Mayfield was the next coming of Drew Brees, Russell Wilson, and Brett Favre in one.

Because we can examine accuracy independent of the box scores—and I did—the truth revealed that Jackson’s accuracy was actually an asset in the middle of the field, whereas Mayfield’s was often a liability. The safest prospects, according to Parcells’ guidelines, won’t inexorably wreck your team’s performance, but it doesn’t mean players not meeting every guideline aren’t worth a franchise-caliber investment.

This idea is absurd because it eliminates valuable context for the sake of simplistic thinking disguised as insight — especially when there are opportunities to contextualize the boxscore data further.

Anthony Richardson's catchable ball rate is fascinating.

Of the 91 charted QBs, only 1 (Marino) had a higher drop rate by his WRs.

The only QB better at avoiding sacks was Philip Rivers.

Had 5th least attempts under 10 yards.

Overall accuracy resembles Geno, Kyler, Pickett pic.twitter.com/qNSPkK7pJj

— Ian (@NFLFilmStudy) April 6, 2023

This analysis above was in line with my charting of Richardson's games. The box-score accuracy percentage looks bad, but Richardson threw realistically catchable passes at a much higher rate.

This is an example of why prospects who don’t meet some of Parcells’ guidelines should have compensatory factors that are compelling enough to override these guardrails. Richardson has uncommon combinations of skills and traits in one player and they are compelling compensatory factors:

• Mobility and mature-economical pocket management.
• A big arm and wise pass placement.
• The ability to buy time and manipulate defenses from a static pocket position.
• Big-play acceleration and stamina to maintain his top speed as a runner.
• Power to break tackles and short-area movement to defeat pursuit angles.
• Elite instinctual learning.

Let's return to Lombardi for a moment. A former executive who began his career as a scout, Lombardi was known for the 49ers' selection of Charles Haley, a Hall of Fame defensive end. Great pick, but not remotely related to quarterbacking.

Absurdity-Squared: Failure to Identify Advanced Quarterbacking Skills

A comprehensive look at Lombardi's resume from scout to personnel director to executive reveals that he has only been an integral part of drafting a first-round quarterback twice in his career: JaMarcus Russell in 2007 and Johnny Manziel in 2014. While colossal mistakes for various reasons, the process is more important than the results.

Steven Ruiz wrote a scathing take-down on Lombardi's guidelines for drafting quarterbacks, which details the K.I.S.S., bullet-point C.Y.A. mentality of an executive who never had success with scouting or drafting a quarterback as part of a team. It also notes Lombardi having a history of bad calls on Donovan McNabb, Cam Newton, and Ryan Tannehill.

I'm all for learning from mistakes. I've had bad calls, and I'll continue to have them in the future. That said, it's absurd-squared that Lombardi cites the film as an argument against Richardson.

Regardless of their athletic ability, the best quarterbacks win from the pocket, and Richardson is arguably the best in this class at managing a pocket. You’re going to hear differently from some in the public analysis sphere, but they’re some of the same analysts who had reservations about Jackson's pocket management.

Scouting football games against a defined list of criteria and grading system is different than casual watching and occasional note-taking — even if you're skilled with Xs and Os or played the game.

Richardson’s biggest issue with pass placement is throws that sail due to his foot placement during his release motion. This is a correctable tweak because it’s a singular part of the release process.

The most egregious mistakes Richardson has made with pass placement were the result of Hero Ball—trying to deliver a big play under heavy pressure where getting the ball off is as much of a chore as earning good placement. I’ve seen countless instances of top prospects making egregious errors due to Hero Ball, including Ben Roethlisberger, Matt Stafford, and Patrick Mahomes II as collegians.

These lapses or displays of unrefined execution are all things we have seen quarterbacks improve upon with daily work/maintenance of their craft. This includes the names mentioned above.

Because Richardson has far fewer starts than these three, he’s getting double-dinged for his mistakes and learning curve. What isn’t discussed as often are the number of opportunities Richardson has had to make significant gaffes last year and, instead, executed like a veteran college star who should acclimate quickly to the NFL. While growth isn’t linear, and you’ll see isolated lapses later in the year, his rapid improvement has been impressive.

Moreover, Richardson has skills that are much harder to teach. In multiple games—and often repeatedly in each game—Richardson combined his efficient pocket management, manipulation of middle-of-the-field defenders, and advanced pass placement into tight windows that protected his receivers.

It’s difficult to teach each of these specific skills separately. The fact that Richardson combines them and generates productive outcomes is uncommon. This requires integrating three demanding skills and applying them with expertise—often in unrehearsed situations. He’s a quarterback who can place the ball in windows where only his receiver can earn the ball, and that window was something the quarterback manipulated open while efficiently maneuvering away from pressure in a crowded and leaky pocket.

These skills are not only far more advanced than the quarterback prospect superficially compared to Richardson but also more advanced than most quarterback prospects entering the NFL.

Absurdity-Cubed: Seeing Malik Willis In Richardson's film

The idea that Lombardi leans so hard on Who Moved My Cheese maxims, didn't see the advanced quarterbacking in Richardson's game when studying the film, and invoked Malik Willis as a point of comparison is absurdity-cubed.

The truest value of Lombardi's perspective is how much they are representative of NFL executives who override sound evaluation processes with simplistic rules designed for gatekeeping and people-pleasing. Corporate media also mimics this perspective, and this quarterback evaluation paradigm is why Anthony Richardson's value is polarizing.

The faction of Richardson evaluators who get it is those who understand that processing confidence — the awareness, accuracy, speed, and certainty of identifying the open receiver and getting the ball out — takes precedence over box-score accuracy, wins, and how well a quarterback demonstrates X and O's knowledge on a whiteboard.

If an evaluator's predominant point of comparison for Richardson is Willis, they're understanding of quarterbacking is too superficial for scouting talent at the position. Willis' decision-making flaws were pervasive throughout his game:

• Touch
• Identifying coverage
• Identifying favorable leverage
• Pocket management and movement
• Scrambling decisions
• Hero-Ball decisions
• A lack of advanced manipulation skills

The only flaws Richardson has in common with Willis are Hero-Ball and coverage identification. Both shortcomings have more to do with playing experience. He reads leverage much better than Willis, and he's a far more mature pocket player and scrambler.

Last year, Willis' supporters in the media made superficial comparisons between Willis and Josh Allen. Willis' skills and style belong more in the spectrum of Michael Vick and Lamar Jackson. However, Jackson is at the far end of the spectrum, Vick is behind Jackson, and Willis is a low-end developmental version of Vick.

The 2023 RSP Scouting Report on Richardson

The information below is the complete scouting report on Richardson from the 2023 Rookie Scouting Portfolio, which includes reports like this for 149 more prospects at QB, RB, WR, and TE. Now in its 18th year of publication, the RSP is one of the two most purchased independent scouting guides by NFL scouts and personnel management, according to SMU's Director of Recruiting, Alex Brown.

It's also the only one of the two guides that also considers a fantasy audience that includes a Post-Draft guide with a tiered cheat sheet of over 200 players and used ADP data to calculate a sweet spot for where to maximize value relative to my post-draft views on prospects.

You get the RSP here. When the Post-Draft is ready, I'll email you and you can download it from the same site.

For additional thoughts on landing spots for Richardson, check out Footballguy Adam Wilde's analysis here.

QB Anthony Richardson #15 Scouting Profile

RSP Ranking: QB1
Height/Weight: 6-4/244 School: Florida
Comparison Spectrum: Ben Roethlisberger-Josh Allen-X-Cam Newton/Daunte Culpepper

Depth of Talent Score: 85.6 = Starter: Starting immediately with a large role and learning on the go. Richardson is on the cusp of the Rotational Starter Tier: A player who executes at a starter level in a role that plays to his strengths.

RSP Accuracy Charting

Games Tracked (Opponent/Date/Link)
• Georgia ‘22
• LSU ‘22
• Tennessee ‘22
• Kentucky ’22
• Texas A&M ‘22
• FSU ‘22

Elevator Pitch: Imagine a quarterback who is as fast as Justin Fields but 17 pounds heavier, with a vertical explosion of 40 inches and a more nuanced understanding of how to manipulate coverage despite playing 12 fewer games in college. What about a passer with arm talent on par with Josh Allen but with more consistent pocket management and smarter pass placement than Allen had in college? Until Richardson came along, you wouldn’t have dared.

And if that’s not enough, consider that Richardson is one of the most impressive learners on and off the field that his quarterback coach Will Hewlett has seen—including Hewlett’s recent success story, Brock Purdy. The best way to visualize Richardson’s comparison spectrum isn’t a straight line but that of a pyramid, with Richardson at the top point and the other players feeding into his game from either side of the spectrum. He’s a unique amalgamation of player styles.

For those of you who can’t get past the 58 percent completion rate, interceptions, and untimely errors, consider that the nature of Richardson’s errors are more akin to problems that we saw with the likes of Matthew Stafford, Patrick Mahomes II, Andrew Luck, and Ben Roethlisberger and not the type of errors linked to Drew Lock, Zach Wilson, and Baker Mayfield.

Read the segment on Richardson in the Underrated and Platform Accuracy section of this chapter, and you’ll learn why accuracy and interception data from the box score lacks the contextual power to provide an optimal evaluation of a quarterback.

Richardson is raw if defining raw as inexperienced—perhaps in the same way that Queen’s Gambit’s Beth Harmon was inexperienced playing tournaments. However, if you’re defining raw as technically and conceptually unskilled—like Malik Willis, for instance—then you’re using the wrong definition.

Richardson, like Josh Allen, will likely have significant highs and lows on the field as he acclimates to starting in the NFL. And like Allen, Richardson should develop into a star.

What you need to see more from Richardson: There are some scenarios where he waits 1-2 beats longer than necessary but still gets the ball to the receiver on time. For the exposures of games I’ve seen, I haven’t seen him display the confidence to deliver the ball when a defender’s back is to him and trailing the intended receiver.

If he can deliver some of these throws with that level of anticipation, it would add to his already strong arsenal of decision-making based on leverage reading that he already illustrates in the flats and at the boundary.

It’s clear that he sees these opportunities in the middle of the field. There are some explainable-logical reasons why he chose not to throw, but this is something to monitor with more games because it may be the next step for him to become a top passer.

Where has the player improved? Richardson has learned to integrate pocket management, coverage manipulation, and pass placement in scenarios that I haven’t seen many top prospects do, especially not as first-year starters.

Where is the player inconsistent? Richardson has lapses with making the correct adjustment to pre-snap coverage looks. He has thrown a pick-six because he didn’t read the Cover 2 and threw a hitch to a receiver who would never adjust to a hitch in this situation.

This is part of the learning process. Some will believe it’s more problematic. I would agree if Richardson was a three-year starter who didn’t integrate difficult-to-teach skills as well as he already does so early into his development. Instead, I think these are lapses that will initially generate outrage but eventually evolve into praise.

What is the best scheme fit? There’s potential for offensive versatility. Philadelphia’s system would be the type of fit that could help him translate early. Detroit would be a strong match with its play-action game and the added dimension of what Richardson can do with his legs. Richardson’s arm could be an upgrade for the Dolphins’ offense with the concepts that defenses are catching onto and forcing Tua Tagovailoa to consider throws he’s uncomfortable making.

What is his ceiling scenario? An All-Pro who can win on and off-script and make those 3-5 plays per game where defenses try to paint a quarterback and the scheme in a corner. If they win, the quarterback’s team loses. If the quarterback wins most of them, his team wins.

What is his floor scenario? A dysfunctional situation that rushes his natural developmental timeline while forcing him to master a denser playbook with a lot of language and nuance that slows down his ability to perform. Then, as the team loses, the owner loses patience, creates a staffing turnstile, and maintains unrealistic expectations for the quarterback.

Physical: Powerful, agile, and quick, Richardson also possesses the stamina to maintain a good rate of speed despite breaking and/or avoiding tackles during a long run. This is the quality Marshawn Lynch had as a running back that allowed him to break long runs. Richardson holds up well in the pocket. Defensive linemen have to wrap Richardson to bring him to the ground.

Technical: His footwork can be faster with certain drops. He sails some intermediate passes. It appears his release footwork is part of the problem. See below.

Conceptual: He’s an excellent pocket manager at this point in his career and better than many prospects I’ve seen. He runs an offense with a lot of shifts. He also makes a fair number of alignment changes based on pre-snap intel. He communicates with his linemen and running backs about pre-snap pressure. He knows when to employ the hard count.

Intuitive: Richardson has a strong feel for manipulating coverage in the middle of the field and in the flats to set up breaks coming from the opposite direction. His pass placement protects his receivers. He also possesses an economical sense of movement in a crowded pocket that athletes with his skills often haven’t refined and at this stage of development, rarely do.

Build: Steve McNair-like build and in the 230-pound range. He’s a big-bodied, agile quarterback with true horsepower/blunt force trauma type of strength when called upon. Like mid-career McNair and Roethlisberger, Richardson uses his size to win from the pocket.

Drops: His initial drop from Pistol or Shotgun is often a one or two-step shuffle. He has two- and three-step drops that are well-defined but lack the quickness necessary to adjust his feet with reliable precision and speed when pressure arrives. This is improvable.

He will adjust his drop motion and slide to a side to access an open passing lane while finishing the initial drop.

Ball Security: When flushing or sliding in the pocket, Richardson holds the ball with both hands. When Richardson transitions from scrambler to runner, he’ll hold the ball high to his frame but loose from his side. The longer he runs, especially when trying to outrun pursuit, the ball drifts wider from his frame. There are runs where a change of direction leads the ball to drift wide, low, and/or loose from his frame.

Richardson will switch the ball to the boundary-side arm as he’s running. He can take slaps to the ball and maintain possession of it while in the pocket.

Play Fakes: With read plays, Richardson will extend the ball toward the runner. He will dip the pads and crouch just long enough to sell the exchange before working into his drop. On other exchanges, he’ll hold the ball for an elongated period with both hands in the belly of the back while reading the defense.

Richardson has variety with his play fakes that mimic the variety with his exchanges. He’ll use one hand with full extension. He’ll use two hands and dip his pads. He’ll deliver an exchange and then turn his back to the defense and play out a run fake to the jet motion behind the exchange point, using both hands to sell it.

Pump Fakes: Richardson executes an effective shoulder fake during a dropback that sells the quick screen before dropping deeper. He also has an abbreviated pump fake that involves the ball. He can deliver this abbreviated pump fake with violence.

Release: Richardson has an over-the-shoulder motion. He varies his release height based on the pressure or if the play is on or off-structure. At the apex of his release, the ball can be well above his head with a clear over-the-shoulder motion with the arm extended high or he can bring it to the height of his ear hole.

The motion is quick enough and has snap when he needs it. He also has a feel for taking something off the ball based on the nature of the target.

The midpoint of Richardson’s back foot is aligned with the target. He gets efficient weight transfer when throwing on a rollout. He’ll also point the front toe to his target while on the move and align the midline of the back foot in these situations as well.

When forced to throw off-platform, he can do so on the move with an abbreviated motion across his body or even sidearm when moving to his left.

There are some intermediate-range throws where Richardson can sail the ball because he’ll take a lead step with his front foot that’s a little beyond shoulder width and the rest of his body is leaning upward as he releases the ball. He steps in the bucket, per se.

Accuracy (No Pressure)

On-Platform Accuracy: He can deliver a deep go up the near-side boundary 47 yards from the pitch with pinpoint accuracy. Richardson can flick the ball 60 yards downfield with at least catchable accuracy, including pinpoint accuracy, after sliding to his left from pressure and resetting. He can deliver a back-shoulder fade against man coverage at 44 yards with pinpoint accuracy. He can throw the deep post off a partial roll against tight man-to-man coverage with pinpoint accuracy covering 58 yards.

Opposite-Hash Accuracy: He can deliver the sail route opposite sideline 29 yards against man coverage with pinpoint accuracy only where the receiver can make the play. He can deliver the go route with catchable-general accuracy at 50 yards to the opposite flat. He can deliver 48 yards opposite hash to the far boundary on a deep sail route against zone.

Mobile Accuracy: He can rush his process with rollouts in the red zone and intermediate-range throws that lead to targets on the cusp of inaccurate/catchable accuracy that should have been firmly pinpointed. Even when his release is timely and uniform, he can be just a step beyond catchable accuracy. He tends to be behind his receiver on rollouts to the short zones—even if there’s no explanation based on coverage for him to place the ball there. He has lapses where he doesn’t account for leverage with single coverage while rolling to his left.

Decision-Making: Richardson will make pre-snap adjustments with alignments, shifting skill players based on the pre-snap look of the defense to run the play to the opposite side of the field as well as communicating what he sees to linemen. He’ll also change to a companion play.

Earlier in the season, Richardson missed a clear Cover 2 read and tried to throw a hitch that resulted in a pick-six against Kentucky.

There’s a lot of promise with Richardson’s pre-snap game. One area where he has room for growth is determining/changing his first read in a progression based on a defense’s late pre-snap movement. The fifth offensive play of the game against LSU is a good example. The more he can identify easy physical/throwing solutions with his eyes/mind pre-snap, the more efficient he’ll become.

When he determines his first read based on the defensive look, he’ll look at both the primary coverage and ancillary coverage. He’ll hold the middle of the field safety on rail shots. When targeting a receiver in the middle of the field who is breaking outside, Richardson will lose awareness of the ancillary defender playing the flat but dropped deep enough to slide over to cut off the route. He also did this earlier in the season, he didn’t account for ancillary coverage as effectively—usually, it was the third and outermost defender working inside.

He executes schemed plays with a good ball fake, shoulder fake, or body movement to sell the development of the play. Richardson will read inside-out, outside-in, and short-to-deep.

When throwing the deep post, Richardson can manipulate the Cover3 MOF safety to the intermediate route crossing the field and then go back late to the post that breaks open behind the defender.

There are also some intermediate targets where you’d like to see Richardson make a throw that’s a quick adjustment to a route that doesn’t break open but anticipates where the receiver is anticipating a potential window of adjustment. For instance, an over route breaking towards a defender coming downhill into the break path but a wide-open zone behind the break path instead of coming off the route and throwing the ball away. The 49th offensive play against LSU is a good example.

I think he can develop along these lines because he has shown the ability to come off a check-down and go back to an intermediate route because he processed the direction of the route behind the flat defender and when he noticed the flat defender bite hard on the check-down, he pulled up and found the intermediate zone route with placement away from ancillary coverage. This is an example of processing speed/field awareness that’s hard to teach but he has it. The 86th offensive play against Tennessee is a good example.

Sense Pressure: Richardson feels interior pressure post-snap and will slide away from it. He also feels edge pressure and takes appropriate action. He identifies pre-snap edge pressure. He’ll communicate pressure potential to his teammates and he will attempt the hard count to bait pressure into a pre-snap foul.

Maneuvering From Pressure: Richardson will shuffle to his right with his feet under his pads and the ball in position for him to throw.

When he feels edge pressure at the top of his drop, Richardson will climb. He has a timely feel for edge pressure and when to begin working up or to the edge of the pocket. He can climb and throw in a quick enough rhythm to get the ball out on shallow targets. Richardson will take a hit to deliver an accurate target—edge pressure or up the middle and from all levels of defenders.

Even when there’s early pressure, Richardson is more apt to climb, sidestep, or flush than retreat or turn his back to the coverage. He exploits small lanes in the pocket with efficient movement so he can deliver the ball.

He’s strong enough to maintain his feet while box defenders wrap him and get the ball out of his hand.

When forced to retreat from pressure, he can deliver pinpoint, accurate short targets while leaning away from the receiver. He’ll curtail flushes only to the point where he had to avoid the pressure, reset and fire quickly to the open check-down. This keeps him on script.

Richardson navigates two points of pressure in succession. He can climb and flush to his left or right, find the open receiver, and deliver the ball with placement that accounts for multiple points of coverage.

When there’s an unblocked defender off the edge at the top of his drop, Richardson will dramatically change the pace of his feet, but he doesn’t overreact with the movement. He can make quick and incremental movements to climb while staying in position to get off the quick throw rather than make a dynamic move that ruins the timing with his receiver and forces his teammates to re-route. He has superb control of his pacing and when to change it to make the play.

He'll often wait until interior pressure is within 1-2 steps of him before maneuvering away from the pursuit.

Accuracy (Pressure)

On-Platform Accuracy: He can layer the ball over the linebacker in the shallow zone to deliver a pinpoint throw to his receiver in the intermediate range with a free blitzer coming off the edge who will undercut Richardson’s legs. The QB will remain patient enough to make an accurate throw.

He’ll deliver a slant to the back shoulder of his receiver breaking toward a safety or linebacker just before taking a hit to his lower legs in the pocket. This is a pinpoint decision.

Off-Platform Accuracy: He can throw at the last moment across his body with an abbreviated motion and on the move in the shallow zone with accuracy. He can weave away from pressure in tight pockets and find an open zone receiver with pinpoint accuracy to the intermediate flats.

Mobile Accuracy: He can make pinpoint-accurate throws in the shallow range of the field while on the move to his left. In the intermediate range, the ball can sail a little high. He has the arm strength to roll right, stop, and fire 64 yards from the pitch point to a receiver, leading the man to an area for an attempt at the ball. I need to see more to determine if his accuracy at this distance is even catchable/general accuracy.

Richardson throws well moving to his left after escaping pressure in the pocket. He can deliver with a balanced release motion and set up with his feet in the intermediate range of the field.

He tends to be behind his receiver on rollouts to the short zones when moving to his right—even if there’s no explanation based on coverage for him to place the ball there. At the same time, he also accounts for ancillary defenders and will place the ball low and in to protect his receiver.

Decision-Making: Richardson reads the development of intermediate routes and identifies the open receiver. He also demonstrates the judgment not to attempt unsound fundamentally unsound throws under pressure despite seeing the open man. He’ll quickly accept he’s not in a position to get the ball out and look for the check-down or break the pocket and take the minimal gain as a runner.

Richardson can read the depth and width of the field with three timely progressions with logical reasons based on the location and/or trajectory of the coverage and why he arrived at the third progression for a check-down.

He’s patient with bleeding space between himself and oncoming pressure to give his check-down the most space available after the catch when pursuit could potentially have a choice between the quarterback and the receiver.

When throwing into the middle of the field against a zone and under pressure, Richardson will try to place the ball away from the MOF defender so the receiver can turn his back to the ball.

There are some scenarios where he waits 1-2 beats longer than necessary but still gets the ball to the receiver on time. He doesn’t have the confidence to deliver the ball when a defender’s back is to him and trailing the intended receiver. If he could deliver some of these throws with that level of anticipation, it would be the sign of an elite decision-maker in the middle of the field.

It’s clear that he sees these opportunities, and there are some explainable-logical reasons why he chose to wait. But this is something to monitor with more games because it may be the next step for him to become a top passer.

He reads ancillary coverage and will place the ball where the receiver either avoids a big hit or can make the catch without that coverage cutting off the target. I’ve seen this multiple times from Richardson, from the pocket and even moving to his left.

He’ll throw the ball away to avoid a sack. There are a couple of throws I’ve seen in three games where I might have given him the benefit of the doubt about throwing the ball away rather than legitimately trying to target a receiver. If it turns out that he was trying to connect with these targets, then there are occasional lapses with getting too aggressive after buying time and trying to force a bigger play than taking the throwaway as a legitimate positive.

Far more often, Richardson throws the ball away after extending a play outside the pocket and nothing coming open in time for him to deliver a safe, realistic target.

There are some vertical shots where he won’t give up on the route after pulling through pressure and working into space, but his receiver has given up because of the distance required of the target.

Richardson will make a logical placement choice with the attempt, but the receiver can’t give up on the play for there to be a chance to make the catch. Richardson will try the target when there’s a reasonable chance to draw a defensive pass interference.

Richardson is patient with zone windows. He’s effective at finding the receiver running the deeper route behind his Mesh receivers and using his eyes to hold the safeties to one side while patiently waiting for the safety on the other side to climb to the mesh option. This opens the field for him to throw to the deeper safety, and he delivers with placement away from the nearest coverage.

Scrambling: Richardson has the size, quickness, speed, strength, and footwork to navigate multiple points of pressure and move in and outside the pocket. He can work across the width of the field to buy time.

Running: He’s strong enough to pull through reaches to his frame and legs from defensive linemen and linebackers. Richardson has the short-area quickness and footwork to sidestep or avoid defenders with stop-start movement. He can bait them to get within 1-2 steps and then take avoidance measures, which maximizes the separation he earns with the movement.

Richardson has sharp lateral movement with jump cuts. It allows him to work across the face of defenders in tight spaces. He has the speed to outrun a linebacker to the far-side boundary, even after beginning the play in the middle of the field and initially working from one flat to the opposite sideline.

Richardson is strong enough to deliver a stiff arm that drops a linebacker to the ground. He pulls through reaches and wraps from box defenders at each level, and he can drag defensive tackles wrapped at his waist for extra yardage.

As a runner, Richardson can work from a boundary track to a downhill track within a transition of two quick steps like a starting running back. He has an effective spin to work through contact and the contact balance to maintain his footing through indirect hits. His speed is on par with Justin Fields. Combined with his power and think of a New Age Steve Young or Steve McNair in the open field.

What’s most impressive about his speed is the stamina to maintain a strong pace after avoiding and breaking multiple tackles.

He’ll finish with effective pad level against defensive backs and smaller linebackers to push forward through wraps. He must learn when to slide to end runs. His slides can be a little awkward because he has a sudden motion to get into the slide that sometimes isn’t executed cleanly. While he can take on a linebacker and win a direct collision with one for positive yardage, you prefer, in most situations, for Richardson to avoid doing so.

Durability: A torn meniscus in high school that he played with until knee surgery in December 2021 cost him the bowl game. He missed two games in 2021 with a knee injury. Also suffered a head injury in late October against South Carolina in 2021. He missed September 2021’s Alabama game with a hamstring injury.

Pre-NFL Draft Fantasy Advice: Richardson is one of the three most compelling quarterbacks in this class. There are rumors that he’s rocketing up draft boards and could even be the first passer taken in the draft.

Of course, with the NFL’s history of quarterback analysis, Richardson could also be the last of the first-round quarterbacks, if not fall to the second round, thanks to a host of reasons. If this happens, it’s possible that Richardson will sit for most of the year like Patrick Mahomes II.

As long as his landing spot isn’t placing him in an Aaron Rodgers/Jordan Love dynamic where the superstar quarterback is at least 3-4 years away from leaving town, Richardson has the highest ceiling for fantasy excellence in this class.

Potential Landing Spots: Check out Adam Wilde's piece at Footballguys for thoughts on fits that could make the most sense for Richardson.

Boiler/Film Room Material (Links to plays)
• Anthony Richardson RSP Film Room: Pocket Manager and Field General (see above)
• Not accounting for ancillary coverage early in the season
• Misreading Cover Two
• Logical decision-making
• Red zone prowess
• Back-shoulder on move
• Manipulating MOF defender
• Sails pass
• Placement under pressure
• Pocket management
• Pinpoint Accuracy
• Pocket management in the red zone
• Anthony Richardson Highlights